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Immediate indefeasibility — Is it under
threat?
Rouhshi Low and Lynden Griggs*
Immediate indefeasibility has been adopted in Australia for close to 40 years.
Recently however, and against the backdrop of economic fragility and global
deregulation, there has been a polite questioning of its place. In Australia,
some may argue that case law developments and legislative reform have
placed indefeasibility under the microscope — in New Zealand, a similar
telescoping by the respected views of their Law Commission. This note
examines these reforms. It concludes that these reforms do not place
immediate indefeasibility under threat. Rather, they modify and adapt the
doctrine to fit within the context of contemporary financial instruments.
Nevertheless, changes have so far been piecemeal, and its time for a
consistent and logical examination of this issue to occur on the national,
rather than the stage of each state.
Introduction
The land registration systems that operate in Australian states are rarely the
subject of interest to talk back radio, current affairs shows, or the public.
However, this all changed recently in Western Australia. Considerable
publicity and angst amongst the community of Perth was seen when a property
owner, living in South Africa and owning investment properties in Western
Australia, discovered that he had been the subject of a swindle that saw his
property being sold without his knowledge. What occurred was that fraudsters
from Nigeria intercepted documents on route to the true owner. Pretending to
be him, they then, through a series of emails and telephone calls contracted
with a real estate agent in Perth to sell the property. The property was
ultimately sold, and the proceeds of sale moved to an offshore bank account.
The true owner was only alerted when his second property was put on the
market and a neighbour alerted him of this fact. While undoubtedly
regrettable, it must be remembered that the possibility of identity fraud has
been present in whatever land registration system one adopts. Perhaps what
should be seen as unusual is that the matter of mortgage fraud has not attracted
greater attention. After all, statistics indicate that some 21% of all serious
fraud involves mortgage fraud.1 Similarly, the determining cases on land law
synopses throughout Australia and New Zealand would feature cases from the
late 1890’s to the present day: Gibbs v Messer,2 Fraser v Walker3 and
* Respectively Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology: Senior Lecturer, University of
Tasmania.
1 P Watkins, Fraud in Conveyancing, paper presented at the Australian Institute of
Conveyancers, 2007 National Conference, March 2007, quoting from R Smith, Serious
Fraud in Australian and New Zealand, Research and Public Policy Series No 48, Australian
Institute of Criminology and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003, cited in New Zealand Law
Commission, A New Land Transfer Act, June 2010, n 33.
2 [1891] AC 248; [1891–4] All ER Rep Ext 2047.
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Breskvar v Wall.4 Respectively, these involved a solicitor utilising the identity
of a non-existent Cameron in an attempt to defraud Mrs Messer; Mrs Fraser
forging the signature of her husband, and Wall having his identity taken by
one Petrie. In one way or another, all cases, extending from the 1890’s to 2010
in Western Australia involve, directly or indirectly, someone assuming or
fraudulently taking the identity of another. A problem only exacerbated today
with the rise of social networking sites and the seeming comfort of millennial
children (the next generation of property owners) to disclose personal details
to the world at large.
For at least 40 years, the resolution of the underlying property disputes to
these scenarios (usually, the context is whether the mortgagee can realise their
security against the true owner) has been guided and informed by the
operation of immediate indefeasibility — the notion that title by registration
cures any invalidity in the preceding instruments. In 1971, the High Court of
Australia accepted that this was the doctrine of choice for Torrens system
registration.5 While one may have thought that this would end the debate, at
least until legislative reform or an overruling by our highest judicial body,
argument continues, at least in academic circles, as to the correct role and
place for immediate indefeasibility and its effect on land transactions. For
example, we see O’Connor describing the controversy between immediate
and deferred indefeasibility in terms of a bijural ambiguity,6 jurisdictions
differing as to whether indefeasibility should be deferred or immediate,7
Zhixiang considering its operation uncertain8 and in the somewhat analogous
context of English registered land, as ‘statutory magic’.9 In addition to this, or
perhaps because of it, we see the academic community and law reform
bodies10 suggesting that irrespective of whether deferred or immediate
indefeasibility is adopted, there should, in addition, be a discretion to override
this should the result of that application be deemed unfair.11 Despite these
concerns about how it should be applied, the High Court’s description of
indefeasibility as the ‘foundation of Torrens system’12 continues to this day,13
with immediate indefeasibility also seemingly endorsed by the Property Law
3 [1967] 1 AC 569; [1967] 1 All ER 649; [1967] 2 WLR 411; [1967] NZLR 1069.
4 [1971] 126 CLR 376; [1972] ALR 205; (1971) 46 ALJR 68; BC7100630.
5 Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376; [1972] ALR 205; (1971) 46 ALJR 68; BC7100630.
6 P O’Connor, ‘Deferred and Immediate Indefeasibility: Bijural Ambiguity in Registered Land
Title Systems’, (2009) 13 Edinburgh L Rev 194.
7 Australia has accepted immediate indefeasibility, some Canadian provinces are immediate,
some deferred, and differences exist between Singapore and Malaysia. See generally
O’Connor, above n 6; L Griggs, ‘Resolving the Debate Surrounding Indefeasibility through
the Eyes of a Consumer’, (2009) 17(2) APLJ 259.
8 S Zhixiang, ‘Rationalising the Singapore Torrens System’ (2008) Singapore Jnl of Legal
Studies 165 at 166.
9 P Matthews, ‘Registered Land, Fraud, and Human Rights’ (2008) 124 LQR 351 at 351.
10 See the comments and sources cited by M Harding and M Bryan, ‘Responding to Fraud in
Title Registration Systems: A Comparative Study’ in M Dixon (Ed), Modern Studies in
Property Law — Volume 5, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009, pp 3, 10.
11 Another approach can be seen with Ontario, who, when introducing electronic registration
diluted the effect of indefeasibility by statutorily modifying the legislation so that deferred
indefeasibility became the norm. B Arrun˜ada, ‘Leaky Title Syndrome’ (2010) New Zealand
L Jnl 115 at 116.
12 Bahr v Nicolay (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 604 at 613; 78 ALR 1; 62 ALJR 268; BC8802595.
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Reform Alliance in the early stages of its draft uniform Torrens Code.14
However, potential for unfairness is patent and overt with this unfairness the
reason why calls continue for reform or rejection of immediate
indefeasibility.15 This inequity is dramatically amplified in Queensland, South
Australia, Victoria and Western Australia where the landowner, subject to
fraud by an imposter, may be sued in a personal capacity for the debt incurred
by the deceiving party.16 This conclusion seems implausible and has not been
accepted in New South Wales, New Zealand and Canada.17 Despite this, the
NSW Supreme Court has described, in emphatic fashion, the importance of
indefeasibility:
Indefeasibility of title is the most fundamental feature of the land registration system
in Australia. Under it, the state guarantees the title of those with a registered interest
in land, to the extent of that interest. The foregoing is trite. But the principle is so
important, and adherence to it so essential, that registered title is able to be
challenged, under the legislative provisions in each of the states, only in the most
exceptional circumstances. The Torrens system has enabled conveyance with
certainty in Australia, and even though there may be occasions where notions of
comparative justice may seem to have been transgressed, it is essential that
indefeasibility of title is not undermined.18
What we seek to do in this brief note is show how the legislative responses to
immediate indefeasibility have, rather than sounded the death knell to the
doctrine, in fact merely responded to the underlying and contemporary
financial deregulation that currently exists in Australia. In so doing, they have
sought to make sense of the confusing morass of case law that is emanating
out of the states. While response to this bayou has differed from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, all responses have, we believe, as their motif, the protection of
the land registration system that has served Australia well for over 150 years,
with at least 40 of those guided by immediate indefeasibility. Our thesis is that
immediate indefeasibility has not been weakened by recent actual and
proposed changes, merely morphed into a doctrine suitable for the context in
which it necessarily sits.
Case law developments
Victoria
The Victorian position is represented by the decision of Tarik Solak v Bank of
Western Aust Ltd.19 An imposter, pretending to be Solak and having obtained
13 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; 236 ALR 209; [2007]
HCA 22; BC200703851.
14 See Property Law Reform Alliance, at <www.plra.com.au> (accessed 2 June 2010).
15 Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English [2009] 14 BPR 26,675; [2009] NSWSC 478;
BC200904808 at [156].
16 For a current analysis of this issue surrounding the right of a mortgagee to pursue a
landowner who has a mortgage attached to the land by a fraudster, see M Harding, ‘Property,
Contract and the Forged Registered Mortgage’ (2010) 24 New Zealand Universities L Rev
22.
17 See the discussion by Harding, ibid, at 29–31.
18 Perpetual Ltd v Barghachoun [2010] NSWSC 108; BC201000922 at [25].
19 [2009] VSC 82; BC200901550.
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possession of the duplicate certificate of title and passport and driver’s licence,
obtained a loan from the Bank of Western Australia. It advanced some
$560,000 to the imposter. The bank registered a mortgage over the land. Most
of this money had been withdrawn by the time the fraud was discovered. The
documents used to create and register the mortgage were standard financial
documentation. The loan contract was an offer from the bank to ‘you’ the
borrower. The imposter acting as ‘Mr Solak’ identified himself as the
borrower. The mortgage instrument did not identify the receipt of an actual
sum of money, this being $560,000. Rather the borrower was liable to repay
the amount owing, with this defined in the registered mortgage document as
‘all monies which you owe the Bank for any reason, under or in relation to a
bank document . . .’. Bank document was defined to include an agreement or
arrangement under which you incur or owe obligations to the bank.
Solak’s argument was simple. He had not assumed any obligation to the
bank. Therefore, he was not a party to a bank document. The document was
void for fraud. There was no amount owing. Indefeasibility was for nothing,
he had an in personam right, supported by authority in New South Wales to
have the mortgage discharged. Despite what may be a natural tendency to
accept each proposition within this logical and linear progress towards
justification of the position of Solak, the Victorian Supreme Court rejected
these arguments. The use of the word ‘you’ was merely a drafting device. In
this instance, the ‘you’ was the imposter and the position would have been the
same had Mr Solak been addressed in the documents by name. In effect, the
policy of immediate indefeasibility was to be given its full force. The bank had
obtained by registration, the benefit of that doctrine and no exceptions could
apply to them. Despite the certainty by which this conclusion was reached,
criticism was swift and stinging. For example, the NZ Supreme Court in
Westpac Banking Corporation v Clark,20 a decision, which on the material
facts for present discussion, could not be distinguished from Solak said as
follows in respect of the reasoning of the Victorian court:
It is erroneous to interpret the loan contract as addressing the imposter and then to
work backwards by transferring that interpretation to the registered documents
merely because the language is common to all. The fact that ‘you’ in the loan
contract is the imposter cannot possibly affect what ‘you’ means in the registered
documents. . . . The registration of a forged mortgage and the consequent
indefeasibility of the charge cannot extend the scope of the intended linkage when
the ‘you’ in the mortgage is the registered proprietor. The covenant to pay in the loan
contract was not secured under the mortgage . . . its indefeasible charge secured
nothing.
New South Wales authority
By contrast to the Victorian position, and arguably emblematic21 of the
position in New South Wales is Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v English.22
20 [2009] NZSC 73 at [49].
21 The matter has been raised in a large number of cases. See Chandra v Perpetual Trustees
Victoria Ltd (2007) 13 BPR 24,675; [2008] NSWSC 178; BC200801332; Provident Capital
Ltd v Printy (2008) 13 BPR 25,199; [2008] NSWCA 131; BC200804171; Vella v Permanent
Mortgages Pty Ltd (2008) 13 BPR 25,343; [2008] NSWSC 505; BC200803886. As to how
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The facts are simple and all too familiar. Mr English forged his wife’s
signature to a loan with Perpetual Trustees. Who should bear the loss, Ms
English or the financial institution? The NSW Court of Appeal held in favour
of Ms English. The document in question provided that ‘I agree to pay the
Secured Money . . .’. The definition of secured money included all amounts
payable under the agreement secured by the mortgage. The offer document
sent to Mr English required that to accept the offer, ‘you, and if there is more
than one person, all of you, must sign’. The conclusion of the court was that
as Ms English had never signed, the loan agreement was never validly created.
The registered mortgage secured nothing. Perpetual was left with a claim
against the now bankrupt Mr English’s interest in the property.
This case can be compared with the recent NSW Court of Appeal decision
in Registrar General of NSW v Van Den Heuvel.23 In facts largely similar to
the above case (a husband forging a wife’s signature), the NSW Court of
Appeal, in a 2:1 decision, concluded that the mortgage secured a debt under
a secured agreement and because of this, the wife’s interest in that land was
charged with that security. Importantly, in terms of distinguishing this from
English, the definition of ‘Secured Agreement’ was interpreted to mean ‘Any
present or future agreement between me or us, or any one of us, and You, or
any agreement which varies such an agreement’. The expression, ‘me, or us,
any one of us’, was ‘apt to refer to the persons named as mortgagors, that is
the husband and the wife, or either of them’.24 By contrast, in English, the loan
offer was only capable of acceptance if both parties to whom the offer was
addressed signed the acceptance, and only one of them had done so. For this
reason, English could be distinguished. Young J in Van Den Heuvel concludes:
The balance of probabilities is that in the light of past history in the industry, the
possibility that the wife’s signature was forged or that the loan was unenforceable
against the wife would have occurred to Perpetual. It would more likely than not
accept that in that situation, so long as the husband was bound, it was commercially
appropriate to lend out the money.25
The dissent of Basten J was equally comprehensible.26 It was not possible to
infer that there would be a concluded agreement in the absence of signing by
both husband and wife. From the contractual material the fact that both
husband and wife were joint tenants and the husband’s belief that forging his
wife’s signature was necessary to receive the monies, the conclusion that was
reached in English (ie, indefeasibility for nothing) was to be preferred.
Addressing the policy implications that a registered mortgage achieved little
if his Honour’s view was to be accepted, Basten J stated:
changes in the language can alter the outcome, see Van Den Heuvel v Perpetual Trustees
Victoria Ltd [2010] NSWCA 171; BC201005096. See S Schroeder and P Lewis,
‘Indefeasibility of title and invalid all moneys mortgages: Determining whether invalid
personal covenants to pay are protected under the indefeasibility umbrella’, (2010) 18 APLJ
185.
22 [2010] ANZ ConvR 10-015.
23 [2010] NSWCA 171; BC201005096.
24 [2010] NSWCA 171; BC201005096 at [4].
25 Ibid, at [168].
26 Ibid, at [51]–[70].
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This conclusion does not undermine the security of the Register, nor the ability of
a transferee of the security to obtain a good title to the mortgage. As explained by
Sackville AJA in English at [97]:
‘It is true that the consequence of the invalidity of antecedent documentation may
produce the result that a registered mortgage does not secure a debt. But that is the
situation where a mortgagor repays the mortgage debt, yet the mortgage remains
undischarged.’27
Legislative proposals
New South Wales legislation
Legislation in New South Wales has been passed, but not yet commenced,
designed to reinforce what we see as the operation of immediate
indefeasibility, while at the same time imposing responsibility on those who
are most able to do this. Section 56C of the Real Property and Conveyancing
Legislation Amendment Act 2009 provides that the mortgagee must take
reasonable steps to ensure that the person who executed the mortgage, or on
whose behalf it has been executed as mortgagor, is the same person as the
registered proprietor of the land. The legislation will indicate that compliance
with the regulations will meet this standard, and that a failure to do this may
lead to a recording being cancelled: s 56(6). The regulations are yet to be
passed, but a consultation paper released by the Land and Property
Management Authority of New South Wales28 sought discussion on the level
of identity verification that should be imposed on mortgagees. The concluded
view of this paper was that the verification regime should contain the
following elements:
1) A face to face interview with the mortgagor(s);
2) Document based verification rather than verification by electronic
data;
3) A minimum of two and preferably three identification documents
(one of which should contain a photograph);29 and
4) Original documents must be sighted, rather than certified copies.30
Recently, New South Wales has also announced enhanced security measures
in respect of certificates of title. Part of the measures includes a new
watermark and a security trustseal designed specifically for certificates of title.
Queensland legislation
Section 11A of the Land Title Act 1994 has a similar intent as the NSW
legislation, and does predate by some years, the NSW reforms. However, there
is a critical difference, and one that we endorse. This legislation expressly
27 Ibid, at [57].
28 Land and Property Management Authority NSW, Consultation Paper Confirmation of
Identity — Sections 56C and 117 of the Real Property Act 1900, 21 December 2009.
29 Satisfactory documents to meet the requirements of the photographic ID are stated to be and
Australian passport (current or expired in last 2 years); an Australian driver’s licence; a
NSW photo card or an Overseas passport. Land and Property Management Authority NSW,
ibid, p 3.
30 Land and Property Management Authority NSW, ibid, p 4.
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provides that a failure to undertake the verification steps will see a mortgagee
unable to rely on indefeasibility: s 185(1A). The New Zealand Law
Commission has suggested that similar reforms be adopted in their
jurisdiction. As the commission notes:
We are . . . of the view that it is prudent to impose a legislative requirement on
mortgagees to take reasonable steps to check that they are dealing with the actual
registered owner and not with a fraudster. This may go some way towards
preventing mortgage fraud becoming widespread. Mortgagees are also usually the
‘cheapest cost avoider’ and are usually in a better position to prevent fraud than is
a registered owner. They can ensure that providing a loan is conditional upon proof
of the borrower’s identity.31
Law reform proposals
New Zealand
The New Zealand Law Commission, in its recent report A New Land Transfer
Act,32 undertake a brief examination of the operation of immediate
indefeasibility. In reforming the law, four options were outlined:
i) Immediate indefeasibility, whereby registration would cure any
forged or otherwise invalid instrument (ie, retention of the current
position);
ii) Immediate indefeasibility with a discretion to order alteration;
iii) Deferred indefeasibility, whereby the original owner could defeat the
title of an innocent purchaser or mortgagee where that title was
obtained from a forged or otherwise invalid instrument (as adopted in
some Canadian jurisdictions); and
iv) Immediate indefeasibility subject to statutory exceptions.33
Option two was preferred. Only a small number of submitters favoured
retention of the status quo, with a small number preferring deferred
indefeasibility. However, as the commission noted, ‘[d]eferred indefeasibility
is the approach adopted in some Canadian provinces like Ontario and New
Brunswick, but there have been subtle differences in its application, and it
suffers from complexity and lack of clarity’.34 Accordingly, it was suggested
that cl 13 of the new Act be in the following terms:
(1) This section applies to a person (person A) —
a) who has been deprived of an estate or interest in land through the
registration under a void or voidable instrument of another person
(person B) as the owner of the estate or interest; or
a) whose estate or interest in land has been adversely affected by the
registration under a void or voidable instrument of another person
(person C) as the owner of an estate or interest in land.
(2) The court may on the application of person A, make an order cancelling the
registration of person B or person C as the owner of the estate or interest . . .
31 New Zealand Law Commission, A New Land Transfer Act, June 2010, at [2.20].
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid, Ch 2.
34 Ibid, at [2.9].
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(4) The court may make an order only if it is satisfied that it would be manifestly
unjust for person B or person C to remain registered owner of the estate or
interest.
Subsection 7 goes on to consider a range of factors that can be taken into
account in considering whether something is manifestly unjust. These include,
amongst others, the circumstances surrounding the acquisition, the nature of
any improvements, the time someone has been in occupation, the identity of
the person in occupation, and the conduct of the parties.
Choices going forward
The financial deregulation that brought us a global economy and the produce
and services of nation states to our doorstep has undoubtedly and, to be
expected, some downsides. One such downside is evident in what happened
in Perth. A person, residing peacefully in South Africa, could expect that the
chance of having their Australian property sold without their authority, and
without any possibility to recover the land itself would be negligible. All too
tragically for this man, his understandable reliance on what many would think
would be the accepted position was sadly mistaken. Monetary compensation
was his only recourse. Immediate indefeasibility was to prevail. The same
result was occasioned upon Solak and Van Den Heuvel, with the mortgagees
enduring the pain in cases such as English. Given this inconsistency, what
should occur? First, the changes made in Queensland seem a worthwhile
initiative and involve little extra compliance for mortgagees. They should
prevent the endemic growth of mortgage fraud. Second, and perhaps allied to
this, mortgagees need to look for ways so that the technical deficiencies of
their mortgage documentation (particularly in the case of ‘all moneys’
mortgages) are overcome. Incorporation of allied documents by direct
reference, or perhaps a ‘return to the future’ of reliance on mortgages for a
specific amount, with this quantum incorporated by express mention in the
registered documents may also be a result of the current tsunami of litigation
on forged mortgages. Third, enhanced and modern security features should be
incorporated in land and other identity documents. No system will ever be fool
proof, but the greater the obstacles, the commensurate reduction in the number
of people who can access the resources to undertake the fraud. Fourth,
consideration should be given to dual or multi factor authentication whereby
someone assuming or claiming title to land would be required to produce not
only evidence of identification, but meet a standard of authentication. In this
context, it can be noted that authentication techniques can be broken down
into three categories:
i) Something you have (such as a certificate of title, or smartcard);
ii) Something you know (such as password or PIN); and
iii) Something you are (biometric facilities — facial image, retinal scan
for example).
Arguably land transactions need to require at least two of these, and if the
concern is so great, and the damage to the system so extensive, then possibly
all three. However, the authors do not downplay, in any way, the difficulties in
achieving this. Land transactions, at least for most natural persons, are
conducted with a level of infrequency that any increase in security would need
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to be balanced with operational requirements. A system so intrusive that
legitimate persons are put to an unduly burdensome onus only imposes costs
within a competitive market that may not match the corresponding benefits.
Accordingly, what may be critical as these matters are debated in the context
of the National Electronic Conveyancing system is how the owner of land
should be involved in determining the appropriate level of security.
Finally, we would argue for the introduction of a general discretionary
provision as has been suggested in New Zealand that would also serve to
ameliorate the most obvious of unfair results. In many cases, the mortgagee
will be fairly compensated in monetary terms, yet the pain felt by the true
owner’s eviction may never be fully met by financial settlement. All of these
measures do not impinge, weaken or mollify immediate indefeasibility. What
they do is place this doctrine within modern times. Immediate indefeasibility
is not under threat from these developments, merely adapting to contemporary
needs. Recognition of this could see greater consistency amongst the cases,
and a uniform response from the legislature. Given the incremental nature of
common law evolution, its time our parliamentarians seriously began to
examine this issue. The impending arrival of electronic conveyancing only
serves to remind us that the time is opportune for this assessment to occur.
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